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The generation that grew up in the 1950s tended to regard the 
rule of one country, one money, managed by one central bank 
as part of the natural order. This generation was responsible for 
the creation of central banks in many countries that acquired 
their independence in that period, including Uganda. There is 
unquestionably much to be said for that arrangement, and yet 
the recent trend has been to back away from such uniformity. 
The world now has several currency unions managed by a single 
central bank, several countries that use the currency of another 
country,  and  a  number  of  countries  that  have  a  nominally 
separate currency that is run by a currency board rather than 
a central bank. Will currencies continue to die out? Will the 
Ugandan shilling be among those that disappear or that cease 
to be managed independently? Should it be? This policy brief 
suggests appropriate considerations for Ugandans as they address 
these issues in the coming years. 
It  is  not  a  coincidence  that  two  of  the  fastest  growing 
countries in the world are the two largest, with populations of 
over a billion people each. Conversely, one reason for Africa’s 
disappointing economic performance in recent years has been its 
division into many small states, one of the unfortunate legacies 
of colonialism. An African Union that emulated the European 
Union in creating an integrated economic space would improve 
the  chances  of  economic  development  and  make  monetary 
union a realistic possibility. While Africa is not yet at this stage, 
the prospect is worth analyzing.
This policy brief first outlines the advantages of what I will 
term the “traditional” arrangement of one country, one money, 
managed by one central bank. I do not intend to challenge the 
view that this arrangement is relatively recent—it emerged in the 
19th century and became dominant only after colonialism essen-
tially disappeared in the second half of the 20th century—and 
was never universal (Helleiner 2003, Cohen 2004). The brief 
then notes that large parts of the world today are not organized 
in this traditional way and describes present arrangements. The 
heart of the policy brief follows in the next three sections: The 
first of these analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of sharing 
monetary sovereignty; the second offers a similar consideration 
of abandoning monetary sovereignty; and the third suggests what 
those considerations imply about the options facing Uganda. A 
short concluding section summarizes the argument.
AdvAntAges of the trAditionAl 
ArrAngement
The traditional arrangement has three very strong advantages. 
First, most nation states satisfy reasonably well most of the char-NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 8  N O V E M B E R   2 0 0 6
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acteristics of an optimum currency area. Second, this arrange-
ment makes the monetary area coincide with the fiscal area. 
Third, it results in clear and unambiguous lines of account-
ability. Let me elaborate on each of these themes.
Robert Mundell’s pioneering article in 1961 originally 
stimulated  the  literature  on  optimum  currency  areas.  He 
identified factors—in his case, labor mobility—that he argued 
were necessary to enable a common money to work effectively 
without giving rise to acute regional problems. Soon other 
economists offered more factors that they thought would be 
necessary for an area to use a single money without paying 
a high price in terms of, for example, undermining the role 
of money. For instance, small and open economies are more 
likely to be part of optimum currency areas than large and 
closed economies. Economies that are subjected to similar real 
shocks have less need for differing monetary policies on anti-
cyclical grounds, and therefore they are more likely to be part 
of the same optimum currency area. Mundell’s initial article 
actually emphasized that just because two regions are part of 
the same country, it is not inevitable that a common money 
is a good idea, and of course he is right. However, I contend 
that even if it is not inevitable that two regions of the same 
country satisfy the optimum currency area conditions, it is 
more likely that they do than do two otherwise similar regions 
in different countries. For example, two regions in the same 
country are likely to experience higher labor mobility than 
two equally distant regions of different countries. Two regions 
of the same country are more likely to be open (at least to each 
other) than if one of the regions is in a separate country. Some 
shocks will tend to have more similar effects where two regions 
have been subject to the same taxes, for example, because they 
will both have come to splurge on gasoline in response to low 
gasoline taxes. On the whole, a nation state is more likely to 
be a reasonably good approximation to an optimum currency 
area than a group of similar regions that are not unified in a 
nation state.
The second advantage of having a nation state use and 
manage a distinct money is that nation states are the principal 
repositories of fiscal responsibility. It is true that subnational 
units often have some powers to tax and spend independently 
of the wishes of the central government, but these powers are 
usually strictly limited and only in few countries do subna-
tional units have much authority to run deficits and surpluses 
independent of the wishes of the central government. Even in 
countries, like the United States, where taxation rates are low 
and state governments are relatively important, as much as 40 
percent of a region-specific shock is offset through the fiscal 
system (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 1992). This system provides 
a  powerful  equilibrating  mechanism,  which  some  argued 
should have been adopted throughout Europe before Euro-
pean Monetary Union was implemented. Some also argue that 
there is no need for such a common fiscal policy as long as 
individual regions in a monetary union are free to run imbal-
ances to offset region-specific shocks. Theoretically, offsetting 
a temporary shock this way is fine, but a permanent shock 
requires  adjustment  rather  than  financing.  When  a  shock 
first occurs, it may not be clear whether it is temporary or 
permanent. If a shock unexpectedly proves permanent, then 
the region may come to regret any delay in starting the needed 
real adjustment, especially if the fiscal stimulus that delayed 
adjustment built up debt, such as a regionally financed imbal-
ance (rather than an imbalance resulting from central stabili-
zation policy). 
The third advantage of the traditional arrangement is 
that there is no doubt where accountability and responsibility 
lie. A government may or may not have set up an indepen-
dent central bank. If it has, it may or may not have spelled 
out its responsibilities (e.g., by naming its inflation target). 
In any event, the national government’s responsibilities and 
constraints are quite clear. European governments that have 
adopted  the  euro  face  a  much  less  clear  situation.  These 
governments retain responsibility for fiscal policy but have 
lost control of monetary policy. Even their fiscal policy is in 
principle constrained through the Growth and Stability Pact, 
although it is unclear whether this constraint is very effective. 
But are national governments still responsible for maintain-
ing a high level of employment? Or is this in some sense a re-
sponsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB)? Or of no 
one?
todAy’s monetAry geogrAphy
Benjamin Cohen (2004) lists the world’s monetary arrange-
ments as including
•	 four currency unions, comprising 36 countries;
•	 13 dollarized countries with no independent currencies;
•	 five near-dollarized countries;
•	 seven bimonetary countries;
•	 seven countries with currency boards; and
•	 44 nonindependent micro-states with currency boards.
One advantage of the traditional 
monetary arrangement is that most 
nation states satisfy reasonably 
well most of the characteristics 
of an optimum currency area. NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 8                                                                                                                                                                                     N O V E M B E R   2 0 0 6
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Cohen’s 13 fully dollarized countries comprise four that 
use the US dollar (East Timor, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
and Palau); six that use the euro (Andorra, Kosovo, Monaco, 
Montenegro, San Marino, and the Vatican); and one that each 
use the Turkish lira (Northern Cyprus), Swiss franc (Liech-
tenstein), and Australian dollar (Nauru). These countries have 
no national currency. (Since most of these countries do not 
actually use the dollar, “dollarized” is clearly a term of art!)
His five near-dollarized countries are commonly thought 
of as dollarized countries: Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama, 
which  use  the  dollar,  and  Kiribati  and Tuvalu,  which  use 
the Australian dollar. These countries are independent states 
whose main money is a foreign currency, but they also issue a 
token local currency.
The seven bimonetary countries are defined as having a 
foreign currency in legal circulation but remaining subsidiary 
as legal tender to the local currency. They are the Bahamas, 
Bhutan, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Palestine, and Tajikistan. 
      The seven independent countries with currency boards 
are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brunei, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Estonia, 
Hong Kong, and Lithuania.1 Djibouti and Hong Kong are 
tied to the US dollar, and Brunei to the Singapore dollar, 
while the other four are now all tied to the euro. Cohen also 
lists 44 nonindependent microstates that also have currency 
boards. Twelve of these economies tie their currencies to the 
dollar, eight to the pound sterling, six to the euro, four each 
to the Australian and New Zealand dollars, three to the CFA 
franc and the Norwegian krone, and two each to the Eastern 
Caribbean dollar and the Danish krone.
Countries  in  which  a  large  part  of  the  money  supply 
consists of dollars, like Bolivia and Peru, appear nowhere on 
Cohen’s lists. They retain a national currency as their sole legal
1. Strictly speaking, six independent countries and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China.
	
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) currently has 
184 members, and a few of those on Cohen’s preceding lists 
(besides the 44 dependencies) are not IMF members, which 
would imply that over 116 countries still have the traditional 
monetary arrangement of one money per country managed by 
its own central bank.
The four currency unions are
•	 the European Monetary Union (EMU), with the euro as 
its currency managed by the European Central Bank, used 
by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
and Spain.
•	 the CFA franc zone, with the CFA franc as its currency, 
used by Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Afri-
can Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The currency is issued by three 
central banks, one for West Africa, another for Central 
Africa (known respectively as Banque Centrale des Etats 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest [BCEAO] and Banque Centrale 
des Etats d’Afrique Centrale [BEAC]), and the central 
bank of the Comoros. In principle, they issue three sepa-
rate currencies, but these have always moved exactly in 
parallel and are collectively known as the CFA franc. 
•	 the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, with the East-
ern Caribbean dollar as its currency managed by a single 
central bank, used by Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines.
•	 the Common Monetary Area (CMA), centered on the 
South African rand, to which the currencies of Lesotho, 
Namibia, and Swaziland are pegged. 
One could question whether the CMA should really be 
described  as  a  currency  union.  The  biggest  country  in  the 
group, South Africa, retains its own central bank. Two of the 
others, Lesotho and Namibia, accept the rand as legal tender, 
but they also have their own national currencies, and, like 
Swaziland, they retain the right to devalue or revalue their own 
currencies. However, they have never exercised this right, so 
their currencies continue to exchange at 1:1 against the rand.
Another currency union has been proposed among what 
are customarily classified as developing countries, although 
their problems are not the usual developing-country prob-
lems. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries plan to 
introduce a common money on January 1, 2010, for Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates.
A country must ask whether political 
symbolism of common money, 
reduced transactions costs (and 
increased trade) and better monetary 
management outweigh the increased 
cost of having to adjust without the 
freedom to vary the exchange rate.NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 8  N O V E M B E R   2 0 0 6
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tender and are therefore counted as countries that retain the 
traditional arrangement.
The IMF counts 51 of its member countries as a part of 
Africa. (Egypt and Libya are counted as a part of the Middle 
East region.) Of these, 15 countries use the CFA franc; four 
countries belong to the CMA, which as suggested above is 
not really a currency union but still seems to be counted as 
such; one country has a currency board (Djibouti); and one 
country  has  a  bimonetary  system  (Liberia).  Thirty  African 
countries manage their own money in the traditional way by 
their own central bank: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, 
Cape Verde, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauri-
tius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé 
and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanza-
nia, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
One should note that Uganda and all of its neighbor-
ing countries—Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Tanza-
nia—have their own money managed by their own central 
bank. It has not always been this way: During the colonial era, 
Uganda shared the East African shilling, based on a currency 
board like most British colonies, with its neighbors Kenya and 
Tanganyika. (At one time the East African shilling also served 
Aden, Ethiopia, British Somaliland, and Zanzibar.) For a time 
after  independence,  an  attempt  was  made  to  preserve  the 
monetary union, with a central bank replacing the currency 
board  shortly  after  independence  to  manage  the  common 
currency. In 1966 the attempt failed, because the three respec-
tive members were pursuing different policies, which led to 
different needs for seigniorage and a failure to decide how to 
distribute the seigniorage benefits. Each of the East African 
countries acquired their own currencies and central banks. 
African countries, just like those in other parts of the 
world, are pursuing a wide variety of exchange rate policies 
(see box 1).2
“Float”  suggests  a  largely  market-determined  exchange 
rate, whereas “fluctuating” means that the government basi-
cally decides what the exchange rate will be without commit-
ting that what it decides tomorrow will bear any relation to 
what it decides today. In allocating countries between these 
two categories, I have drawn on the studies reported in Masson 
and Pattillo (2005). In some cases the reports differed, and my 
judgment is not necessarily definitive.
It is worth noting that the countries adjacent to Uganda 
are all listed as either floating or fluctuating. None of these 
governments  have  any  announced  policy  to  manage  the 
exchange rate, although they differ in the extent to which the 
government is committed to allowing market forces to deter-
mine the rate.
2. These judgments are based largely on IMF classification and the results of 
research conducted by Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger, and 
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, reported in table 2-1 of Masson and 
Pattillo (2005).
Box 1   Exchange rate policies of African countries
Country     Policy
Algeria	 	 	 Fluctuating
Angola	 	 	 Fluctuating
Botswana	 	 Pegged to basket
Burundi	 	 	 Fluctuating
CapeVerde	 	 Pegged to euro
CFA franc		 	 Pegged to euro
Congo	 	 	 Float
Djibouti	 	 	 Currency board
to US dollar
Eritrea	 	 	 Peg
Ethiopia	 	 	 Float
The Gambia	 	 Float	
Ghana	 	 	 Fluctuating
Guinea	 	 	 Fluctuating
Kenya	 	 	 Fluctuating
Lesotho	 	 	 Pegged to rand
Liberia	 	 	 Fluctuating
Madagascar	 	 Float
Malawi	 	 	 Float	





Namibia	 	 	 Pegged to rand
Nigeria	 	 	 Float
Rwanda	 	 	 Float
SãoTomé and Principe	 Float
Seychelles	 	 Fluctuating
Sierra Leone	 	 Float	
Somalia	 	 	 Float
South Africa	 	 Float
Sudan	 	 	 Fluctuating
Swaziland	 	 Pegged to rand
Tanzania		 	 Float
Tunisia	 	 	 Fluctuating
Uganda	 	 	 Float
Zambia	 	 	 Fluctuating
Zimbabwe	 	 FluctuatingNU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 8                                                                                                                                                                                     N O V E M B E R   2 0 0 6
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 Table 1   Impact of losing control of monetary policy
Consideration Monetary union Dollarization Currency board
Transactions costs Reduced with other 





Exchange rate as 
an instrument of 
adjustment
Lost; serious if shocks
with partners are 
asymmetric
Lost; serious if shocks 
with center country 
are asymmetric
Lost; serious if shocks 
with center country are 
asymmetric
Quality of monetary 
policy in absence of 
differential shocks
Perhaps improved, 
if suitable partners exist
Probably more reliable,
if suitable center country 
is available
Probably more reliable, 
if suitable center country 
is available
Seigniorage Requires agreement, 
which would be likely
Unlikely Retained
Political symbol Ambiguous but often 
important
Negative No impact
Diplomatic influence Reduced Reduced Reduced to some extent
pros And Cons of shAring monetAry 
sovereignty
Countries  entering  a  monetary  union  agree  to  share  their 
monetary sovereignty. (It is not at all clear whether South Afri-
ca is sharing its monetary sovereignty with Lesotho, Namibia, 
and Swaziland, which is why I questioned whether the CMA 
should be classified as a monetary union.) They agree to accept 
the economic consequences of living with the monetary deci-
sions made by the union-wide monetary authority, and they 
agree  to  share  with  their  partners  the  seigniorage  that  the 
money creation process generates. 
Cohen (2004) classifies the considerations that may influ-
ence a country’s decision as to whether to retain an indepen-





•	 political symbol, and
•	 diplomatic influence.
Sharing a common money clearly saves on transactions 
costs. The more the transactions, the greater the savings. There 
is,  however,  rather  little  benefit  on  this  score  in  sharing  a 
money with a country or group of countries with which one 
trades little, because there are not many transactions to save 
money on. The low level of existing intra-African trade has 
made many economists skeptical as to whether there would 
be significant benefits in achieving monetary unification in 
Africa.  Admittedly,  in  principle,  one  ought  to  look  at  the 
potential postunion trade rather than the existing level of trade 
with separate moneys. Some estimates suggest that a common 
money can have a dramatic (threefold) impact on the level of 
trade (Rose 2000; Masson and Pattillo 2005, box 4-1). This 
suggests that an analysis restricted to examining the impact 
of lower transactions on the existing volume of transactions 
may miss the most important component of the benefits. The 
reduction in transactions costs to be expected from entering a 
monetary union is noted in table 1.
Most of the economic literature on monetary unification 
has been concerned with macroeconomic flexibility. Robert 
Mundell focused on the question of labor mobility because 
such mobility would provide an alternative adjustment mech-
anism if there were no exchange rate flexibility to motivate a 
shift of production to the region that had suffered a loss of 
demand. Economists seek to calculate how much of a negative 
demand shock is offset through the fiscal system, because it 
provides a way of offsetting a shift of demand that does not NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 8  N O V E M B E R   2 0 0 6
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involve the affected region building up its indebtedness. Econ-
omists ask whether two regions suffer from a similar pattern 
of demand shocks to find out whether their unification in a 
single monetary system is likely to create an adjustment prob-
lem. This cost of monetary unification is noted in row 2 of 
table 1, which also notes that the costs are likely to be serious 
if real shocks are asymmetrical among the partner countries. 
But the question has a second aspect, which is of at least 
equal potential importance to the first, and that is whether 
the monetary policy followed by the common central bank is 
more likely to be responsible. Monetary policy may be neutral 
in the long run, but this is true only in such a long run as to be 
irrelevant for practical purposes. Unfortunately we have all too 
many examples of central banks that have done their coun-
tries a disservice by pursuing bad monetary policies. Assum-
ing away country/region-specific shocks, would the common 
central bank pursue a better target level of demand? Or would 
it suffer from an inflationary or deflationary bias in the level 
of demand that it targets with its interest rate policy? The first 
column of row 3 of table 1 suggests that if suitable partners 
can be found, a common central bank is more likely to follow 
a  responsible  policy.  A  common  central  bank  will  be  less 
beholden to short-term political interests, will have resulted 
from a diplomatic balance between competing interests, and 
will be able to call on a richer range of professional expertise 
than any single central bank. 
The issue of any money other than commodity money 
creates a profit, known as seigniorage, for the agency entrusted 
with its issue. The seigniorage issue is who should receive the 
profit that results from the issue of money. In a single coun-
try, the country’s government receives that profit, directly or 
indirectly (via the central bank). In a monetary union, an 
agreement is needed to distribute the seigniorage. If several 
central banks are entitled to issue money, these banks could 
each  be  allowed  to  keep  the  seigniorage  from  the  money 
they  have  created.  An  absence  of  constraints  on  the  issue 
of money by each bank invites them to compete with each 
other to issue as much money as possible, since their partners 
pay the bulk of the cost while the issuing banks reap all the 
seigniorage benefits. An example of this lack of constraints is 
the hyperinflation throughout the Soviet Union in its dying 
days. (“The worst monetary system in the world” is how Larry 
Summers described a common money with multiple central 
banks entitled to issue it.) If there are several central banks, it 
is much better to have incentives for responsible money issue 
combined with an explicit agreement on how the seigniorage 
will be distributed, for example, as the CMA has. (The South 
African Reserve Bank runs monetary policy, with Lesotho and 
Namibia entitled to a share in the seigniorage corresponding 
to the estimated circulation of rands in their countries.) Or 
else one should have a single central bank whose monetary 
issue is determined by the needs of its economy. The central 
bank  then  distributes  the  profits  of  seigniorage  among  its 
member  governments  by  a  formula  such  as  the  estimated 
demand for currency in each of the countries. This is how the 
ECB, BCEAO, and BEAC function. One might expect that 
any monetary union that is created will include arrangements 
governing the distribution of seigniorage, as noted in the first 
column of row 4 of table 1.
Cohen berates economists for focusing on the economic 
issues involved in operating a common money, while neglect-
ing important political issues. Money is sometimes regarded 
as a political symbol; people get attached to their national 
moneys. For example, the Germans took pride in the strength 
of the deutsche mark. However, one suspects that the citizens 
of some of the European countries with weaker currencies 
take more pride in the euro than they did in the drachma, 
lira, or escudo. And strong political pressures appear to favor a 
monetary union in East Africa. Table 1 reflects this ambiguity 
in the fifth row.
Cohen draws attention to another political consideration, 
what he calls diplomatic influence. He argues that a country 
that abandons its monetary sovereignty is handing over an 
important policy lever to foreigners. This applies to sharing 
monetary sovereignty as well as abandoning it; under an East 
African currency union, Kenyans and Tanzanians, as well as 
Ugandans, would decide the monetary policy that Uganda 
should pursue. Similarly, policymakers lose a degree of free-
dom in joining a monetary union, because in a sufficiently 
desperate last resort they can draw on seigniorage. This loss of 
“diplomatic influence”3 that a country suffers from losing its 
national money is noted in the final row of table 1.
In the early days of independence, a country was often 
thought to need a flag, an anthem, an airline, and a money 
issued  by  its  own  central  bank  to  be  considered  a  proper 
country. Today a number of countries share their money or 
have  outsourced  their  monetary  policy  to  another  country 
(see next section), and one is less inclined to dismiss these 
countries as less than full nation-states. Similarly, a number of 
countries have sold off their airlines to foreign bidders without 
3.   I am not sure this is the right phrase, but I do not have a substitute.
If suitable partners can be found, a 
common central bank is more likely 
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provoking accusations that they are not proper countries. It 
is all a question of weighing costs and benefits. Do the lower 
transactions costs (and therefore perhaps increased trade) and 
maybe better management of a common money outweigh the 
increased cost of having to adjust without the freedom to vary 
the exchange rate4 by enough to justify any political symbol-
ism of losing a national money and the reduction in diplo-
matic influence? Or is there a desire for a common money that 
outweighs any costs in terms of more difficult adjustment and 
reduced diplomatic influence (after netting out the benefits of 
reduced transactions costs)?
pros And Cons of AbAndoning monetAry 
sovereignty
Abandonment of monetary sovereignty implies a permanent 
and irrevocable outsourcing of monetary policy to another 
country: either full dollarization or what Cohen calls near-
dollarization. The use of a currency board also implies the 
outsourcing  of  monetary  policy  but  without  the  presump-
tion that it is permanent and irrevocable. (Governments may 
declare their intention of permanence when they announce 
establishment of a currency board, like Argentina did, but in 
a sufficiently desperate last analysis they have the ability to 
change their minds. Perhaps one day the same will be true in 
a near-dollarized country, but going back on the decision to 
use a foreign money will be more difficult.) A country with a 
bimonetary system may act as though it had a currency board, 
but there seems no legal presumption that it has to act that 
way. Of course, failure to outsource monetary policy will lead 
to fluctuations in the exchange rate between the two moneys.
Let us proceed to examine the impact of dollarization and 
its close relatives in terms of the five areas Cohen suggests.
Full and near dollarization will have the same impact in 
reducing transactions costs as would formation of a monetary 
union, though with residents of the center country rather than 
the partner countries. This is noted in the second column of 
row 1 of table 1. However, forming a currency board would 
have essentially no such impact: There would still be a need 
to convert one money into another. Adopting a bimonetary 
system might make things worse. As long as the local monetary 
authority maintains a fixed exchange rate with the other circu-
lating  currency,  transactions  costs  might  remain  moderate, 
though there is no reason to suppose that they would be lower 
than with an orthodox central bank. But if the two moneys 
started to fluctuate in terms of one another, then there would 
4.  Or to allow a floating exchange rate to vary.
be  transactions  costs  for  internal,  as  well  as  international, 
transactions.
Ignoring the case of a bimonetary system with a fluctuat-
ing exchange rate, all of the dollarization options deprive a 
country of the ability to use the exchange rate as an instru-
ment of adjustment, just like entering a monetary union does. 
This will matter if the country suffers real shocks that differ 
significantly with the center country in timing, direction, or 
magnitude. This is noted in row 2 of table 1.
Presumably one of the factors that the authorities would 
take into account when deciding whether and whom to peg 
to is the quality of the center country’s monetary policy and 
its appropriateness for the situation of the prospective pegging 
country. The authorities will want to find a major internation-
al currency with an unblemished record of inflation control, 
which is also not prone to long bouts of inappropriately high 
interest rates. And they will need to assure themselves that 
this record is likely to continue in the future, and that their 
initial inflation rate is sufficiently similar to that of the center 
country as to make it feasible to maintain an exchange rate peg 
indefinitely without putting the economy through the ringer. 
Adopting another country’s currency would be unwise unless 
a large proportion of trade occurs with that country, for if a 
lot of trade occurs with the rest of the world, then the effective 
exchange rate can still change even if the bilateral exchange 
rate is pegged. If a center country satisfying these conditions 
is found, then outsourcing of monetary policy is likely to lead 
to an improvement, since the chances of monetary adventures 
are lower, and the resources available to the monetary author-
ity of the center country are vastly greater. This is reflected 
in row 3 of table 1. (Of course, one should still ask whether 
pegging to this currency would risk creating severe asymmetric 
shocks, as stated in row 2.)
South Africa is the only historical example of a country 
sharing seigniorage revenue. A bill was once introduced into 
the US Congress that would have had the US Federal Reserve 
System refund a part of the seigniorage revenue to dollarizing 
countries but was never passed. As of now, it would be unwise 
for any dollarizing country to count on obtaining a share of 
the seigniorage revenue. This is reflected in row 4 of table 1. 
The main advantage of a currency board is that it provides a 
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mechanism by which a country can outsource its monetary 
policy and still gain most of the seigniorage.
While  some  people  may  take  more  pride  in  a  shared 
money than in a national money, it is difficult to imagine that 
anyone would take pride in using another country’s currency. 
And dollarization, and to a lesser extent a currency board, 
would certainly reduce a country’s diplomatic influence. These 
negative outcomes are noted in the last two rows of the last 
two columns of table 1.
the ChoiCes fACing UgAndA
Given the preceding analysis, what are the options available 
to Uganda, what are the analyses that might shed light on the 
merits of adopting one of these options, and what political 
considerations are relevant in making a decision?
First consider the possibilities of sharing monetary sover-
eignty, i.e., of finding partner countries with which to share 
a common money. As emphasized above, these partner coun-
tries need to be countries that would not only share similar 
real shocks but also could be relied on to agree to instruct 
a common central bank to pursue responsible policies. Two 
such groups of countries come to mind: Uganda’s old partners 
in the East African Community, namely Kenya and Tanzania, 
and an African-wide grouping, presumably based on the Afri-
can Union. Perhaps there is some other possibility, but it is not 
evident from afar. Therefore, I will consider how each of these 
two possibilities might compare with the status quo, in which 
the Bank of Uganda provides a national money.
The savings in transactions costs on the basis of the exist-
ing volume of trade should be easily calculable. (The volume of 
trade within East Africa has increased rapidly in recent years, so 
the economy in transactions costs would now be nonderisory.) 
In addition, sharing a common money is expected to boost the 
volume of trade, so a calculation based on the existing trade 
volume would be a minimum estimate. One could also note 
the Rose estimate that a common money can be expected to 
triple the volume of trade. This estimate strikes some of us as 
extravagant, so it might in practice be used as an upper bound, 
although there is really no scientific basis for using it that way. 
One would presumably experience some welfare gain from 
any increased volume of trade, so the economy in transactions 
costs would be a minimum figure for the benefit.
The  starting  point  for  estimating  the  cost  in  terms 
of more costly adjustment to real shocks is to calculate the 
asymmetry in real shocks. Since neither Kenya nor Tanzania 
are oil exporters, while the African region as a whole is, one 
might guess that this consideration will point to bigger costs 
stemming from a monetary union embracing all of Africa. 
Unfortunately,  calculation  of  the  asymmetrical  nature  of 
shocks is only the first step in assessing the additional cost of 
adjustment. Ideally one would also want to know the extent to 
which a common central bank would allow such shocks to be 
translated into exchange rate changes, rather than be absorbed 
by reserve changes, and hence whether it would lead to a risk 
of Dutch disease in countries like Uganda when oil prices are 
high. One would also like to have estimates of the excess cost 
of adjusting without using the exchange rate. I am not aware 
that anyone has as yet developed a convincing base for making 
such estimates, and hence I doubt that one can go beyond 
the first stage of assessing whether asymmetries are likely to 
pose a serious problem. In any event, all this will change when 
Uganda becomes an oil exporter.
Recent statistics show no evidence that the Bank of Ugan-
da pursued an irresponsible monetary policy in recent years. 
Nevertheless,  a  common  money  with  Kenya  and Tanzania 
could provide more robust assurances against future political 
developments in Uganda than those that can be furnished by 
official independence for the Bank of Uganda. On the other 
hand, it is not clear whether Africa is politically stable enough 
to manage a pan-African money. 
Any monetary union would be likely to contain provi-
sions for a distribution of seigniorage that would essentially 
replicate what Uganda can expect to get on its own.
So far as political symbolism is concerned, there seems to 
be a strong desire to switch back to a joint money with Kenya 
and Tanzania. A pan-African money is clearly further away, 
but it might be seen as a historic achievement, if it occurred 
in a form that gave confidence that it was going to be a stable, 
well-managed money.
Loss of a separate national money would compromise the 
ability of the Ugandan government to manage its economy 
independently of its partners. 
Since Uganda is geographically far away from any of the 
countries with a major international currency, it is not an 
obvious candidate to give up its national money in favor of 
another country’s currency. However, the three least implau-
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sible candidates would be the US dollar, the euro, and the 
rand. It would therefore be worthwhile to perform calculations 
similar to those discussed above to get some feel for the reduc-
tion in transactions costs that would be involved in adopting 
each of these currencies. Similarly, one could usefully examine 
the asymmetry in the pattern of shocks between Uganda and 
each of the potential center countries.
It is unlikely that any of the center countries, except South 
Africa, would be prepared to share seigniorage with Uganda. 
Presumably  the  political  symbolism  of  adopting  another 
country’s money would be unwelcome in each case. Such a 
step may erode Uganda’s ability to operate independently.
A move to a currency board would have fewer implica-
tions. It would not eliminate transactions costs, and it would 
leave seigniorage unchanged. There would be little political 
symbolism and no undermining of diplomatic influence. The 
implications  would  be  entirely  monetary,  in  which  respect 
they would be the same as those of dollarization with the same 
currency. That is to say, one should again worry about the loss 
of an adjustment mechanism if shocks were asymmetric, in 
exchange for which one would presumably hope to import a 
more stable monetary policy. 
ConClUding remArks
The  basic  way  to  view  the  question  of  whether  to  share 
monetary sovereignty is to ask whether the political symbol 
of a common money, lower transactions costs (and therefore 
perhaps increased trade), and maybe better management of 
a common money outweigh the increased cost of having to 
adjust without the freedom to vary the exchange rate. A deci-
sion to adopt another country’s currency demands a similar 
cost-benefit  approach:  a  weighing  of  reduced  transactions 
costs and increased trade and a higher probability of good 
monetary  management  against  increased  adjustment  cost, 
lost seigniorage, and the political and diplomatic costs. The 
relevant considerations are laid out in table 1.
Much of the impetus in the United States urging other 
countries to dollarize or adopt currency boards stems from the 
poor performance of many central banks in the past 40 years. 
If we were making the decisions of the 1960s in the light of 
what we now know, I doubt that we would be so comfort-
able  urging  the  creation  of  central  banks.  Many  countries 
have had very high, and very painful, inflation. But countries 
have learned from those experiences, and I doubt they will 
be repeated. If the era of monetary adventures is indeed over, 
then decent monetary management can be expected whether 
or not countries outsource monetary policy. The important 
issues are political symbolism and adjustment costs.
referenCes
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2004. The Future of Money. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Helleiner, Eric. 2003. The Making of National Money: Terri-
torial Currencies in Historical Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Masson, Paul R., and Catherine Pattillo. 2005. The Monetary 
Geography of Africa. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Mundell, Robert A. 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas. American Economic Review 51: 509–17.
Rose, Andrew. 2000. One Money, One Market: Estimating 
the Effects of Common Currencies on Trade. Economic Policy 
30: 9–45.
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1992. Fiscal Feder-
alism  and  Optimum  Currency  Areas:  Evidence  for  Europe 
from the United States. In Establishing a Central Bank: Issues 
in Europe and Lessons from the US, ed. M. B. Canzoneri, V. 
Grilli, and Paul R. Masson. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.